There has been a lot of talk about turning college football players into employees as if this would be a simple solution.There’s also this idea that what we have right now because of the freedom of movement and the unlimited, basically, salaries for players is that we have a free market. I don’t think that’s true at all. You can’t call it a free market when it’s largely being run by public entities.
If you wanted a true free market, you’d have to separate your football teams into their own private entities. I have long wondered whether or not they’d be able to survive and what their costs would be.
I asked AI to do a cost analysis of what it would take to run a standalone FBS football team year to year.
To be exact, this is Claude Opus 4.5. I gave it a prompt, telling it to act as an athletic director with 15 years experience, an MBA, and an attorney. Then I asked it to come up with a cost analysis, including health insurance and including facilities costs, because no university would allow a private entity to just have their stadium for free.
This is a very long document because it’s a very complex subject. I would appreciate any feedback anybody has on it.
Rip it apart, agree with it or not.
But it seems to me that people who think college football could survive on its own don’t really look at the entire cost of running a football team.
Prepared by: Athletic Director (15 Years Experience), J.D., MBA
December 2025
The question of whether an FBS football program could survive as an independent entity—fully severed from university support—has become increasingly relevant given the House v. NCAA settlement, conference realignment, and the broader transformation of college athletics economics.
The short answer is stark: It would cost approximately $90-160 million annually to operate a competitive Power Four-level FBS program independently, and even a minimum-viable Group of Five operation would require $40-70 million per year.
Only a handful of programs in the country could survive without institutional subsidy, and those that could would require robust, diversified revenue streams. This analysis examines the full cost structure a standalone football entity would face, including operating expenses, player compensation under the new revenue-sharing model, health insurance and workers’ compensation (costs universities currently avoid), and facility lease arrangements.
Based on FY2024 data, football operating expenses vary dramatically across the FBS landscape:
| Tier | Annual Football Operating Budget |
|---|---|
| Elite Power Four (Ohio State, Texas, Alabama) | $60-80 million |
| Mid-Power Four | $35-50 million |
| Lower Power Four | $25-35 million |
| Upper Group of Five | $15-25 million |
| Lower Group of Five | $8-15 million |
Texas reported the largest operating budget in history for FY2024, generating $331.9 million in revenue and accumulating $325 million in expenses for the entire athletic department.
The reality is sobering: all FBS school athletic departments incur significant annual net operating losses. Power conference schools use big athletic department contributions to fund most of their operating losses, while other schools must rely heavily on direct school support and student fees. For example, UCLA had a $51.85 million budget deficit in FY24—the sixth straight year of operating deficits totaling $219.55 million. Ohio State accumulated $292.3 million in expenses compared to $254.9 million in revenue, resulting in a near $38 million budget deficit.
| Position/Category | Annual Cost Range |
|---|---|
| Head Coach Salary | $7-10 million |
| 10 Assistant Coaches | $5-8 million combined |
| Support Staff (strength, recruiting, analysts) | $3-5 million |
| Personnel Subtotal | $15-23 million |
Nine coaches now make $10 million or more in 2025. Georgia’s Kirby Smart leads at approximately $13.3 million. The average FBS head coach salary is approximately $3.76 million, though the median is closer to $2.5 million.
The House v. NCAA settlement, approved on June 6, 2025, fundamentally restructured player compensation:
| Category | Cost |
|---|---|
| Revenue Sharing Pool (2025-26 cap) | $20.5 million |
| Revenue Sharing Pool (by 2034-35) | ~$32.9 million |
| Scholarships (85 players × $60-80K COA) | $5.1-6.8 million |
| Player Cost Subtotal | $25.6-27.3 million |
Under the NCAA revenue sharing model, schools can elect to make payments directly to athletes up to $20.5 million per year. The annual cap will increase to around $32 million over the next ten years. This is new money that didn’t exist as a line item 18 months ago.
| Category | Annual Cost Range |
|---|---|
| Team Travel (charter flights, hotels, meals) | $3-5 million |
| Recruiting | $2-4 million |
| Equipment and Uniforms | $1-2 million |
| Game Day Operations | $1.5-3 million |
| Video, Technology, Analytics | $500K-1 million |
| Medical/Training | $1-2 million |
| Operations Subtotal | $9-17 million |
| Category | Annual Cost Range |
|---|---|
| Stadium operations and maintenance | $5-15 million |
| Practice facility | $2-5 million |
| Facilities Subtotal | $7-20 million |
| Category | Annual Cost Range |
|---|---|
| Compliance, Legal, HR | $2-4 million |
| Insurance (liability, catastrophic) | $1-3 million |
| Marketing/Communications | $1-2 million |
| Admin Subtotal | $4-9 million |
Total Annual Operating Cost (University-Integrated Model): $60-96 million
For a Group of Five program operating at minimum competitive levels: $25-40 million
This section addresses costs that universities currently avoid through the “student-athlete” classification—costs that would become unavoidable for a private standalone entity.
The term “student-athlete” was created so that colleges wouldn’t be held liable for sports-related injuries. This legal fiction has saved programs billions over the decades.
Consider the disparity: If a football coach breaks his leg while standing on the sidelines, his immediate and long-term medical expenses would likely be paid completely by the school through a workers’ compensation plan. If a player on that same team breaks his leg during that same game, his personal insurance would likely have to pay—he is a “student-athlete” and not an employee.
NCAA bylaws require that member institutions verify student-athletes have insurance coverage for athletically related injuries up to the deductible of the NCAA Catastrophic Injury Insurance Program (currently $90,000). A 2016 NCAA survey found that 30% of Division I schools do not provide any health insurance for their athletes.
If you’re running a private football operation with players as employees, the entire calculus changes dramatically.
Average annual premiums for employer-sponsored health insurance in 2025: $9,325 for single coverage and $26,993 for family coverage. For a 120-man roster:
| Coverage Type | Per Player | Total Annual Cost |
|---|---|---|
| Single coverage (young players) | $9,325 | $1.12 million |
| Enhanced athletic coverage premium | +$5,000-10,000 | $600K-1.2 million |
| Health Insurance Subtotal | $1.7-2.3 million |
Football players have among the highest injury rates of any occupation. Workers’ compensation rates for professional athletes in high-risk sports typically run 15-25% of payroll.
| Scenario | Rate | Annual Cost |
|---|---|---|
| Conservative | 15% | $3.0 million |
| Realistic | 20-25% | $4.0-5.0 million |
For a roster of NFL-caliber prospects and practice squad players, catastrophic coverage runs approximately $500K-1 million annually.
This is the sleeper issue. Currently, under the NCAA’s Catastrophic Injury Program, athletes must report injuries within twenty-four consecutive months to qualify for long-term benefits. Universities are largely off the hook for CTE and other latent injuries.
A private entity would face potential tort liability for brain injuries, long-term care obligations, and no protection from the “student-athlete” legal shield. Conservative annual reserve: $1-3 million (or self-insure with reserves of $15-30 million).
| Category | Annual Cost |
|---|---|
| Standard Health Insurance | $1.7-2.3 million |
| Workers’ Compensation | $3.0-5.0 million |
| Catastrophic/Disability | $0.5-1.0 million |
| Long-term Liability Reserve | $1.0-3.0 million |
| TOTAL | $6.2-11.3 million |
This is money that universities currently don’t pay because players aren’t classified as employees. The moment you spin off as a private entity, you’re looking at $6-11 million annually that wasn’t in the previous budget.
Universities own the stadiums, practice facilities, weight rooms, and training complexes. A private team would need to lease these assets—and universities would have significant leverage in negotiations.
NFL stadium lease arrangements provide baseline context:
| Team/Stadium | Annual Rent |
|---|---|
| Chicago Bears (Soldier Field) | $5.7 million/year |
| Cincinnati Bengals (Paul Brown Stadium) | $7.4 million/year |
| Kansas City Chiefs (new stadium) | $7 million/year (escalating) |
| Jacksonville Jaguars (EverBank Stadium) | $1 million/year base |
| Buffalo Bills (new stadium) | $900,000/year |
Critical distinction: NFL teams typically control all revenue streams (concessions, parking, naming rights) as part of their lease arrangements. A college team leasing from a university would face a very different deal structure.
Universities would consider debt service on the facility (typically $15-25M/year on a major stadium), opportunity cost of the land, and administrative burden.
Conservative estimate: $8-15 million base rent
Unlike NFL deals where teams keep 100% of game-day revenue, universities would want a cut:
| Revenue Stream | University Share |
|---|---|
| Concessions | 15-25% of gross |
| Parking | 20-30% of gross |
| Suite revenue | 10-20% of gross |
| Non-football events | 50/50 split |
Estimated annual cost: $5-12 million
| Category | Annual Cost |
|---|---|
| Game day operations (security, ushers, medical) | $3.5-7 million |
| Utilities | $1-2 million |
| Routine maintenance | $2-4 million |
| Capital reserve fund | $3-5 million |
Most major programs have invested $50-150 million in dedicated football facilities. Lease cost for practice facilities: $3-6 million annually (approximately 5-8% of replacement cost).
| Facility Component | Annual Cost |
|---|---|
| Stadium Base Rent | $8-15 million |
| Revenue Sharing (Concessions, Parking, etc.) | $5-12 million |
| Game Day Operations | $3.5-7 million |
| Utilities & Maintenance | $3-6 million |
| Capital Reserve | $3-5 million |
| Practice Facility Lease | $3-6 million |
| TOTAL | $25.5-51 million |
| Source | Elite Power Four | Mid-Power Four | Group of Five |
|---|---|---|---|
| Media Rights | $50-80 million | $30-50 million | $2-8 million |
| Ticket Sales | $25-50 million | $15-30 million | $3-10 million |
| Donations/Development | $30-100 million | $10-30 million | $2-10 million |
| Sponsorships/Advertising | $15-30 million | $8-15 million | $2-5 million |
| Licensing/Merchandise | $5-15 million | $2-5 million | $500K-2 million |
| Game Guarantees | $0 | $0-2 million | $2-5 million |
You cannot survive without a conference media deal. Those distributions range from $50-80 million annually for SEC/Big Ten schools down to $2-8 million for most Group of Five programs. An independent program faces enormous revenue challenges.
Beyond institutional revenue sharing, top programs are spending significant additional amounts through NIL collectives. Texas A&M athletes received $51.4 million in NIL revenue from July 2024 to June 2025. Ohio State reportedly spent approximately $20 million on roster construction. Top programs are spending $15-25 million annually on football NIL alone.
A private entity fully severed from the university would not technically be subject to Title IX requirements. This could theoretically save $15-30 million that currently cross-subsidizes women’s sports and non-revenue men’s sports.
However, several complications arise:
| Category | Power Four | Group of Five |
|---|---|---|
| Base Football Operations | $60-96 million | $25-40 million |
| Health Insurance/Workers’ Comp | $6-11 million | $4-7 million |
| Stadium & Facility Lease | $25-51 million | $10-20 million |
| TOTAL ANNUAL COST | $91-158 million | $39-67 million |
| Cost Category | University Model | Standalone Model | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Health/Workers’ Comp | Minimal | $6-11 million | +$6-11 million |
| Facilities | Subsidized/no rent | $25-51 million | +$25-51 million |
| Administrative | Shared services | Full allocation | +$3-8 million |
| Additional Annual Cost | $34-70 million |
To operate as a truly standalone Power Four football program, you would need to generate $90-160 million annually just to break even.
Programs with Realistic Standalone Viability (10-15 nationally):
These programs have stadium capacity exceeding 80,000, conference media distributions of $50+ million, established donor bases capable of $30+ million annually, national brand recognition supporting licensing revenue, and geographic markets supporting premium ticket pricing.
Mid-Tier Power Four Programs would require $15-40 million annual subsidy or significant operational cuts.
Group of Five Programs cannot survive independently under any realistic scenario. James Madison University, for example, charges over $55 million annually in athletic fees ($2,456 per student)—that level of student fee subsidy is the only way many G5 programs remain viable.
The business model of college football has always been predicated on institutional subsidy, tax advantages, and cross-subsidization from the university. Remove those pillars, and you’re essentially asking programs to operate as minor league NFL franchises—without the NFL’s revenue sharing, salary caps, national broadcast contracts, or 32-team competitive balance.
The numbers are unambiguous: a truly standalone FBS football program would cost $90-160 million annually to operate at a competitive Power Four level.
That’s $30-70 million more than current operating budgets suggest, because universities currently avoid health insurance costs through the student-athlete designation and don’t charge market-rate facility leases to their own athletic departments.
Of the 134 FBS programs, perhaps 10-15 could survive this transition. Everyone else is either losing money already or dependent on institutional support that disappears the moment you sever the umbilical cord.
It’s not impossible. But it requires a fundamental reimagining of the enterprise—and a revenue base that only a handful of programs have built.
This analysis is based on publicly available financial data from FY2024 NCAA reporting, the Knight-Newhouse College Athletics Database, the House v. NCAA settlement documents, Kaiser Family Foundation employer health benefits surveys, and NFL stadium lease agreements.
